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The paper bridges a gap in the literature by using moment analysis, CAPM statistics, stochastic 
dominance (SD) test, and volume analysis to examine investor preferences for warrants 
between China and Taiwan, and investigating why the market for warrants in China has to close 
while the market for Taiwan warrants is successful. Using moment analysis, it is shown that 
that buying China warrants has a higher likelihood of losses than its Taiwan counterpart. Using 
CAPM analysis, in general, both the Sharpe ratio and Jensen index for warrants from the 
Taiwan market are more reasonable, while that from the China market is too negative. On the 
other hand, the Treynor index for China warrants shows that China warrants are highly volatile. 
This could make investors avoid investing in China warrants which, in turn, could lead to its 
closure. Using SD analysis, though there is no arbitrage opportunity between the China and 
Taiwan warrant markets, it is shown that the markets for China and Taiwan warrants are not 
efficient, and second- and third-order risk averters prefer to invest in China warrants to warrants 
in Taiwan. This implies that the warrant issuers prefer to issue Taiwan warrants than China 
warrants. Using volume analysis, the China warrant market is much more active than the 
Taiwan warrant market. This could imply that there are more speculative activities in China 
than in Taiwan which, in turn, could lead to China’s decision to close its warrant market. The 
findings in the paper are useful for investors for investment decisions regarding Taiwan and 
China warrants, for academic analysis for modelling Taiwan and China warrants, and policy 
makers for policy making related to Taiwan and China warrants. In the future, China may 
rethink reopening warrant markets and learning from mature-covered warrant markets such as 
Taiwan how to inhibit excess speculation and educate warrant investors. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The paper compares investor preferences between the two largest warrant markets in Greater 
China, namely Mainland China and Taiwan. Both markets are politically, economically and 
financially competitive, and always seem to be catching the eyes of the world. The comparison 
period was chosen such that China was experiencing reforms and opening up the securities 
market, while Taiwan was in the process of party rotation and economic transformation.  
 
Warrants are one of the most commonly traded financial products in financial markets 
internationally. China has been developing its stock markets very well, to be one of the largest 
stock markets in the world, while the Taiwan stock market is much smaller, being ranked in the 
top 20 stock exhcanges, according to various international databases (see, for example, 
http://www.visualcapitalist.com/20-largest-stock-exchanges-world/). On the other hand, the 
market for warrants is financially successful in Taiwan, which was initiated in 1997, while the 
market for warrants in China, which was initiated in 2004, was prevalent in Mainland China, 
especially in 2006, but closed in 2010.  For this reason, among others,, it is interesting to study 
why the market of warrants in China was prevalent in Mainland China, especially in 2006, but 
closed in 2010. 
 
Most of the warrants traded in China by the end of 2008 were covered warrants, connected 
with the flotation of non-tradable shares (the Chinese share reform started in 2005, with two 
share types, tradable shares and non-tradable shares, before the reform). The unique 
characteristics of China warrants and irrational investor behavior in the China warrant market 
are important in the financial literature. Therefore, it is interesting to study investor 
performance and risk preference in the China warrant market. In the case of warrants in China, 
the warrants can be calls or puts.  
 
When call options are exercised by investors, non-tradable shares are issued by the Chinese 
company, leaving the total number of outstanding shares unchanged. Therefore, there is no 
issue about dilution of earnings when warrants are exercised. In this aspect, warrants in China 
are similar to covered warrants in Europe and Asia. However, covered warrants in Europe and 
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Asia are issued by third parties, such as banks whereas, in China, most warrants are issued by 
separate companies. 
 
After the stock reforms in 2005, China’s equity warrants market became the second largest in 
the world in terms of trading value, after Germany, surpassing Hong Kong in 2006. The growth 
in the warrants market in China has been constrained by the gradual expiration of reform-
related warrants, excessive speculation, and lack of understanding of the warrants market by 
its participants. The mechanism for creating special warrants designed as a transition to the 
development of covered warrants has been under hot debate. A more refined regulatory 
framework and a stronger institutional investor base are needed, and are prerequisites for a 
smoothly-functioning warrants market. 
 
In order to foster the long-term development of the warrants market in China, financial experts 
have argued that issuing covered warrants is crucial, together with proper regulation. Domestic 
brokerages and exchanges have been lobbying the Chinese government to approve the issuance 
of covered warrants in a more formal setting. Securities firms argue that allowing brokers to 
launch covered warrants will significantly boost supply. That is, it is expected that the covered 
warrants will help in pricing securities more efficiently, thereby increasing the market depth of 
both the warrant and underlying stock markets. At the same time, it may effectively help curb 
the current speculative sentiment in China’s financial markets. 
 
The split-share structure was a legacy of China’s initial share issue privatization (SIP), in which 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) went public to issue minority tradable shares to institutional 
and individual investors. On the other hand, the Chinese government withheld control of these 
listed SOEs by owning majority non-tradable shares. Although the split-share structure played 
a positive role in facilitating the SIP, it jeopardized China’s continued privatization efforts by 
restricting the tradability of state-owned shares in the secondary market, and also caused 
serious corporate governance problems, encouraged speculation in the stock market, and 
blocked mergers and acquisitions.  
 
In 2005, the Split-Share Structure Reform was initiated to dismantle the dual share structure 
by converting non-tradable shares into tradable shares. The reform effectively removed the 
legal and technical obstacles of transferring state-owned shares to public investors, opening up 
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the gate to China’s secondary privatization which, in contrast to the initial SIP, would further 
liberalize state-owned shares in full circulation. 
 
However, there have been very few studies, if any, comparing the China and Taiwan warrant 
markets in which both the main participants of securities markets are individual investors or 
corporate investors. The Taiwan warrant market was established in 1997, while the China 
warrant market began in 2004. The background of the developing warrant market in Taiwan is 
to provide diversified investment and hedging tools compared with a tool of compensation in 
the share reforms in China. The China warrant market became the largest warrant market in the 
world in terms of trading volume in 2006, shortly after its inception. In 2006, the Taiwan 
warrant market was ranked at number 9 according to the total trading volume provided by the 
World Federation of Exchanges (WFE).  
 
Although Greater China share a common culture, the background of developing warrant 
markets are different in China and Taiwan. In the period 2004 to 2008, Taiwan’s economy faced 
a huge problem because of industry transformation, with many entrepreneurs moving their 
factories to Mainland China. In addition, Taiwan experienced the first party transition and the 
ruling party was politically against Chinese authority, while Mainland China was devoted to 
the reform and opened its market at the same time. Therefore, in addition to political 
competition between Taiwan and Mainland China, the two economies were also facing 
industrial competition. Economic development will be reflected in the performance of the 
securities markets. Among other reasons, it will be interesting to compare the warrant markets 
in China and Taiwan. 
 
In order to compare the China and Taiwan warrant markets, there are several differences that 
are worth mentioning. First, China developed its warrant market in 2004 mainly for the purpose 
of the share-split reform, which was intended to allow government-held non-tradable shares to 
become tradable in the market. In order to make up possible losses of original tradable 
shareholders, some corporations issued warrants and granted these warrants as compensation. 
However, the warrants in Taiwan and Hong Kong are issued by third parties, that is, securities 
corporations, and not by the corporations themselves. Securities corporations issue warrants, 
sell them to investors, and hedge by buying underlying stocks. Second, the Taiwan warrant 




In addition, they also play roles of market makers to facilitate market liquidity. In China, 
corporations themselves issue warrants based on their non-tradable stocks as underlying stocks, 
and neither hedge nor play as market makers. Third, the number of issued warrants in the two 
markets differs substantially. In China, there were only 55 warrants traded in the market, but 
the trading volume was once ranked as the largest in the world. In Taiwan, the warrant market 
experienced rises and falls, and currently there are more than 10 thousand warrants issued every 
year. Moreover, Taiwan has both vanilla and exotic types of warrant,s while China has only 
vanilla-type warrants.  
 
Finally, the transaction mechanism in the two markets are different. In Taiwan, trading warrants 
are similar to trading stocks in terms of trading rules and transaction costs. However, it is 
distinct from trade stocks and trade warrants in China. The detailed mechanism of the China 
warrant market is described below. 
 
The China warrant market attracted a lot of funds from investors, and became the largest in the 
world in terms of total trading volume, even though there were only 55 warrants in the market. 
The high turnover of warrants in China could be attributed to the warrants “T+0” trading rule, 
high volatility, and exmption from transaction taxes. Warrants were the only security in China 
with a “T+0” trading mechanism, that is, investors are able to sell warrants on the same trading 
day when they are purchased. On the other hand, stocks could only be sold on the next trading 
day (that is, the “T+1” rule).  
 
Additionally, stock prices are restricted to fluctuate within 10% of the closing price on the 
previous trading day, while the range was usually over 25% of the closing price for the warrant 
on the preceding trading day. Moreover, trading in warrants was exempted from the 0.2% to 
0.3% transaction tax or stamp duty, and hence trading warrants benefit from a tax advantage. 
These special characteristics provided greater flexibility for investors on trading warrants. 
Therefore, warrants were the only securities for intraday trading, and hence attracted significant 
trading activities. 
 
In this paper, we bridge a gap in the literature by using moment analysis, CAPM statistics, SD 
test, and volume analysis to examine investor preferences for warrants between China and 
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Taiwan, and investigate why the market for warrants in China had to close, while the market 
in Taiwan is successful financially. Using moment analysis, buying China warrants has a much 
higher opportunity for making losses as compared with Taiwan. This could make investors 
avoid investing in China warrants which, in turn, could lead to the closure of the market for 
warrants.  
Using CAPM analysis, we conclude that, in general, both the Sharpe ratio and Jensen index for 
warrants from the Taiwan market are more attractive financially, while the China market is too 
negative. On the other hand, the Treynor index for China warrants shows that they are highly 
volatile. Therefore, China closed its warrant market after the end of the share-split reform, 
where the warrants expired completely in 2010.  
Based on SD analysis, it can be inferred that there are no arbitrage opportunities between the 
China and Taiwan warrant markets, the markets of China and Taiwan warrants are not efficient, 
and second- and third-order risk averters prefer to invest in China as compared with Taiwan. 
This implies that warrant issuers prefer to Taiwan warrants to their counterparts in China. This 
could be another reason why the market of China warrants closed.  
Using volume analysis, the China warrant market is clearly much more active than the Taiwan 
warrant market. This could imply that there are more speculative activities in China than in 
Taiwan which, in turn, could lead to China’s decision to close its warrant market. The findings 
in the paper are important for investors for their investment decisions regarding Taiwan and 
China warrants, challenging to academics for their study on modeling Taiwan and China 
warrants, and useful for policy makers for their policy making related to Taiwan and China 
warrants. In the future, China should seriously reconsider reopening its warrant market and 
learning from mature-covered warrant markets, such as Taiwan, on how to inhibit excess 
speculation and to educate warrant investors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature 
pertaining to covered warrants and the stochastic dominance rules, as well as the rationale 
behind the SD tests. The data, sample characteristics, and methodology are discussed in Section 
3. The empirical results are analysed in Section 4, while Section 5 gives some concluding 
remarks. 
 




Many studies have investigated Chinese and Taiwanese warrant markets. For example, Xiong 
and Yu (2011) find that the daily trading volume of many warrants is more  than 3 times that 
of the issuance volume, even though these put warrants were extremely out of the money 
between 2005 and 2008. The market is useful for examining price bubbles because of obsevable 
underlying stock prices and the limited life of the warrants to determine the values of the 
associated contingent claims. Bubbles can be used to test bubble theories such as rational 
bubbles, agency problems, gambling behaviour, resale option theory, non-common knowledge 
of rationality, feedback loop theory, among other interesting topics. The authors conclude that 
short selling restrictions and heterogeneous beliefs drive bubbles. 
Some previous studies have focused on issuance, hedging and expiration effects of warrants on 
stock returns (Draper et al., 2001; Aitken and Segara, 2005; Liao and Chen, 2010; Chung et al., 
2014). For example, Chung et al. (2014) examine the impact of covered warrant hedging on 
underlying stocks on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. They find significant positive abnormal 
returns and trading volume before the announcement of issuing warrants, especially for large 
hedging demand warrants. Their findings show that stock return volatility is positively related 
to the price elasticity of hedging demand.  
Additionally, the authors discover a significant negative effect on stock prices after a call 
warrant has expired in-the-money because of the liquidation of the hedging portfolio. In China, 
Liao and Chen (2010) find that the expiration of call warrants has a significantly negative price 
effect during the last four days of the exercise period, whereas the expiration of put warrants 
exhibits no significant price effects. Overall, the trading activities of call warrants have a more 
profound effect than their put counterparts around the expiration day.  
Previous studies have also compared the prices of warrants and options with the same 
underlying stocks.  For instance, Li and Zhang (2011) and Chan and Pinder (2000) find 
derivative warrants generally have higher prices than corresponding options, with the price 
differences reflecting the liquidity premiums of derivative warrants over options in the Hong 
Kong and Australian markets, respectively. Horst and Veld (2008) compare the price 
differences between 16 Euronext Amsterdam options and warrants, and find that investors may 
perceive warrants as another type of instrument, and that the warrants are over-priced over the 
first five trading days.  
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Bartram and Fehle (2007) examine the degree of the bid-ask spread between warrants and 
options in Germany, and find that, with overlapped underlying, both warrants and options 
experienced lower bid-ask spreads due to competition between options and warrants.  Petrella 
(2006) examines the bid-ask spread of covered warrants in Italy, and finds that the reservation 
spread plays an important role in determining the warrant spreads that are connected with the 
underlying spreads. 
As the China warrant market is relatively young and speculative, investors have largely 
participated in the market for its special characteristics, namely the speculative behaviour of 
retail investors in China warrant markets (Xiong and Yu, 2011). Additionally, speculative 
activities in the warrant market can be contagious and spill over across stock markets (Liu et 
al., 2014). Tang and Wang (2013) examine warrant return properties, volatility behaviour and 
pricing errors, and document a stylized fact that call warrants have considerable linkage with 
their underlying financial assets, but put warrants have almost none.  
The combination of the arbitrage pricing theory and the resale-option bubble theory proposed 
by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) is adopted to explain this stylized fact. In addition, Liao et 
al. (2014) examine the incidence of two types of irrational exercise behaviour in the China 
warrants market, and find that 121.64 million shares of warrants were either exercised with an 
immediate loss, or failed to be exercised because of warrant holder ignorance and/or negligence 
of warrant mechanics. 
Furthermore, several studies analysed pricing errors of warrants and hedging risks. For 
example, Chang et al. (2013) find that the market price of warrants are far higher than the prices 
from Black-Scholes models using historical volatilities. In addition, warrant prices and their 
underlying stock prices are not monotonic, perfectly correlated, and following option 
redundancy properties. Cumulative delta hedge profits for most mature warrants are negative, 
and these negative profits are mainly from volatility risks, trading value of put warrants, and 
market risk of call warrants.  
Powers and Xiao (2014) adopt three standard pricing models and document that put warrant 
market prices averaged 1.2 yuan more than model-generated prices (over-priced), while call 
warrant prices averaged 1.9 yuan less (under-priced). The authors explain the mispricing due 
to an implicit discount on the value of stocks when pricing warrants as investors take the 
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potential burst of a stock market bubble into account and a premium on warrants to fulfill 
speculation purpose or tax advantage.  
Liao et al. (2012) observe that creation mechanics (that is, increasing the supply of securities) 
similar with the short-selling property is useful for reducing bubble issues in China warrant 
market,s but additional warrant supply can only reduce instead of eliminating bubbles. Fung et 
al. (2009) review the development of the China warrants market, and highlight the issues of 
over-speculation and lacking of recognition of participants. The authors suggest that the market 
requires a more regulated structure and more institutional investors as the cornerstone of the 
market.  
Some studies have applied MV, CAPM, and SD to warrant markets. For example, Chan et al. 
(2012) examine in the UK covered warrants market by using SD. Their empirical results show 
that neither covered warrants nor their underlying shares stochastically dominate each other, 
implying both markets are efficient. They also find that UK covered warrant returns efficiently 
reflect the return information of the underlying shares from a likelihood ratio (LR) test. As 
distinct from their analysis on warrants and their underlying shares, we compare warrants in 
the China and Taiwan markets with similarities (for example, retail investors are main market 
participants) and differences (for example, the issuers are share-reform companies in China 
and securities companies in Taiwan) in terms of stochastic dominance.  
A variety of interesting papers have applied the MV rule, CAPM statistics, and SD tests to 
examine the performance of other markets. For example, applying the SD test and other 
techniques,  Abid et al. (2009) investigate the performance of different option strategies; Qiao 
et al. (2012, 2013) and Lean et al. (2010, 2015) evaluate the relationship between spot and 
futures prices; Bouri et al. (2018) study the role of wine investment within a portfolio of 
different assets; Qiao and Wong (2015) and Tsang et al. (2016) examine whether the housing 
market in Hong Kong is efficient; Hoang et al. (2015a, b, 2018) and Khamlichi et al. (2018) 
examine the role of gold in the diversification of portfolios; Vieito et al. (2015) and Zhu et al. 
(2018) investigate whether the financial crisis had any positive impacts on stock markets; Broll 
et al. (2006, 2015) analyse banks behaviour; Egozcue and Wong  (2010), Egozcue et al. (2011), 
Abid et al. (2014), and Lozza et al. (2018) examine investor behaviour in diversification; Fong 
et al. (2005, 2008) and Lean et al. (2007) study investor behaviour in stock markets; Ma and 
Wong (2010), Alghalith et al. (2016), Guo et al.  (2017), and Niu et al. (2017) examine different 
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risk measures; and Chiang et al. (2008) and Lean et al. (2013) evaluate the performance of 
different funds.  
 




The warrant data are obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). There are 55 warrants 
listed in the Shanghai and Shenzen Stock Exchanges between 2005 and 2009 (65 warrants were 
issued in the period, but only 55 of them were listed). For comparison, we randomly select 44 
covered warrants of which the underlying stocks are in the list of the Taiwan 50 index in the 
same period (from 2005 to 2009, 44 of the top 50 Taiwan companies were issued corresponding 
warrants). The daily data include tickers, warrant prices, underlying stock prices, adjusted 
strike prices, data dates, issuance dates, maturity dates, and others. The conclusions are drawn 
based on the selected data. 
 
China and Taiuwan warrants are denoted by C and T, respectively. As there are too many 
warrants in both the China and Taiwan markets, we follow Wong et al. (2008) in selecting the 
most representative warrants that have the maximum and minimum values of the of mean, 
standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio for both China and Taiwan. In addition, we include the 
maximum and minimum of the beta value, Jensen index, and Treynor index for both China and 
Taiwan.  
 
The China warrants are denoted as: C06 for the minimum Sharpe ratio; C12 for the maximum 
Treynor index; C14 for the minimum mean and the minimum Jensen index; C23 for the 
maximum mean, the maximum Sharpe ratio, and the maximum Jensen index; C44 for the 
minimum standard deviation; C47 for the maximum standard deviation and the minimum beta 
value; C52 for the maximum beta value; and C55 for the minimum Treynor index.  
 
The Taiwan warrants are denoted as: T1 for the minimum Jensen index; T12 for the maximum 
standard deviation; T13 for the minimum mean; T15 for the minimum Sharpe ratio; T17 for 
the minimum standard deviation, the maximum Sharpe ratio, the minimum beta value, and the 
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maximum Treynor index; T25 for the minimum Treynor index; T26 for the maximum beta 





In this paper, we use the MV rule, CAPM statistics, SD test, and volume analysis to examine 
the investor preferences towards the warrants between China and Taiwan. We first discuss the 
MV rule in the following subsection. 
3.2.1 Mean-variance (MV) criteria  
Define Uj  as the set of utility functions such that: 
1 ( ){ :( 1) 0, 1, , }i ijU u u i j+= − ≥ = L       (1) 
where u(i) is the ith derivative of the utility function U.   
For the returns Y and Z of any two assets or portfolios with means µy and µz and standard 
deviations σy and σz, respectively, the MV rule (Markowitz 1952; Bai, et al., 2009; Leung, et 
al., 2012) is such that Y is said to dominate Z if µy ≥ µz and σy ≤ σz , and if the inequality holds 
in at least one of the two conditions. Wong (2007) and Guo and Wong (2016) show that if 
Y	dominates Z by the MV rule, denoted by Y ≻ z , then risk averters with u(1) > 0 and  u(2) < 
0  will attain higher expected utility by holding Y	than Z under certain conditions. The theory 
can be extended to non-differentiable utilities (see Wong and Ma, 2008).  
 
3.2.2 Stochastic dominance (SD) approach  
Let Y and Z represent the returns of two assets or portfolios with a common support of  =
[
, ]  (a < b), cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), F and G, and corresponding 
probability density functions (PDFs), f and g, respectively, so that we define: 
 = ℎ, 				 =          (2) 





We call the integral   the jth-order integral for  = , . Y is said to dominate Z by FSD (SSD, 
TSD), denoted by 
  
(  ,  ), if ( ) ( )1 1F x G x≤   ( ( ) ( )2 2F x G x≤  ,
( ) ( )3 3F x G x≤ ) for all possible returns x, and the strict inequality holds for at least one small 
open interval of x, where FSD (SSD, TSD) denotes first-order (second-order, third-order) SD, 
respectively. For , we need a further condition:  ! ≥  # (see Sriboonchitta et al. (2009), 
Levy (2015), Guo and Wong (2016), and the references listed therein, for further information 
on the SD definitions for any order.   
The SD tests have been well developed (Davidson and Duclos, DD, 2000; Bai, et al., 2011; Ng, 
et al., 2017) to allow statistical significance to be determined. The SD test developed by DD is 
found to be powerful, less conservative in size, and robust to non-iid and heteroscedastic data 
(Lean et al., 2008). As Bai et al. (2015) derive the limiting process of the DD statistic when the 
underlying processes are dependent or independent, we use their SD tests in the empirical 
analysis.  
Let {%}' = 1,2,⋯+, and {%}	-' = 1,2,⋯+./	 be observations drawn from the returns of 
any two assets or portfolios, Y and Z, with CDFs F and G, respectively. For a grid of pre-
selected points x1, x2… xk, the jth-order SD test statistic, 0 (j = 1, 2, and 3), is defined as: 
0 = 1234235673                           (3) 
where 
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jF  and jG  are defined in (2). For all ' = 1,2, . . . , 9, we test the following hypotheses: 
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Not rejecting either 	or : implies the non-existence of any SD relationship between ;	and 
<. If ::=	of order one is accepted, then ;< stochastically dominates <; at first order, 
denoted by X ≻1 Y		Y ≻1 X  . If :  :=	 is accepted at order two [three], then ;< 
stochastically dominates <;  at second order, denoted by X ≻2 Y		Y ≻2 X , 
[X ≻3 Y		Y ≻3 X]. Readers may refer to Bai et al. (2015) for the decision rules and further 
information on the tests, and Chan et al. (2016) for testing the third-order SD.  
 
Bai et al. (2015) derive the limiting process of the SD statistic 0 so that the SD test can be 
performed by using		@
A B0B to account for the dependency of the partitions. We follow 
their recommendation in the empirical analysis. As Fong et al. (2005), Lean et al. (2008, 2010), 
among others, recommend a limited number (100) of grids for comparison, we adopt their 
suggestion. In order to minimize Type II errors and to accommodate the effect of almost SD 
(Leshno and Levy, 2002; Guo, et al., 2013, 2014, 2016), we follow Gasbarro et al. (2007), 
Clark et al. (2016), among others, to use a conservative 5% cut-off point in examining the 
proportion of test statistics to draw inferences.  
 
4. Empirical Results  
 
This section discusses the empirical results. We use moment analysis, CAPM statistics, SD test, 
and volume analysis to examine investor preferences for warrants between China and Taiwan, 
and investigate why the market of warrants in China closed while the market of Taiwan 
warrants is successful. We note that the moment analysis (Chan et al., 2017) includes the mean-
variance (MV) rule and the analysis of higher-order moments.  
 




The MV rule is used to examine the performance between China and Taiwan warrants. In order 
to do so, we examine the descriptive statistics of daily excess returns in Table 1 and the results 
of the t and F tests in Table 2 for selected China and Taiwan warrants. 
 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
We compare warrants with minimum daily excess returns from China and Taiwan, which are 
represented by C14 and T13, respectively. From Table 1, the mean excess return of T13 is 
higher than that of C14, while the standard deviation of the former is smaller. However, the 
insignificant t and F statistics in Table 2 conclude there is no MV dominance between T13 and 
C14 using the MV approach. We also compare warrants with maximum daily excess returns 
from China and Taiwan, which are represented by C23 and T33, respectively. Although T33 
has larger mean excess returns, it also has a higher standard deviation than C23. Therefore, 
there is no MV dominance between T33 and C23 using the MV approach. 
Next we compare warrants with minimum (maximum) daily standard deviations from China 
and Taiwan, which are represented by C44 and T17 (C47 and T12), respectively. It is found 
that T17 has significantly higher mean excess return and significantly higher standard deviation 
than C44, so there is no MV dominance between T33 and C23 using the MV approach. 
However, T12 has insignificantly higher mean excess return and significantly higher standard 
deviation than C47, implying that C47 dominates T12 using the MV approach. With the MV 
criterion, we find that five pairs of China warrants dominate Taiwan warrants, and three pairs 
of Taiwan warrants dominate China warrants. The other four pairs have not shown any 
dominance between China and Taiwan warrants. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 indicate the following. First, the mean excess returns are, in general, higher for 
Taiwan warrants, while most of the mean excess returns for both China and Taiwan warrants 
are negative, which implies that the mean excess returns of China warrants are more negative. 
This could make investors avoid investing in China warrants which, in turn, could lead to the 
closure of the market for China warrants.  
 
In addition, most of the China warrants are significant and negatively skewed, while most of 
the Taiwan warrants are either significantly and positively skewed or are not significantly 
skewed. Moreover, China warrants have much greater and significant kurtosis. These statistics 
16 
 
suggest that buying China warrants has a higher chance of accruing losses. The skewness and 
kurtosis suggest that the opportunities of returns for China warrants being negative are very 
high. This could make investors avoid investing in China warrants which, in turn, could lead 
to the closure of the warrants market in China. 
 
4.2 CAPM analysis 
 
For the CAPM statistics, the Sharpe ratio that measures the excess return per unit of risk is the 
conventional formula for stock evaluation where the risk is determined by the standard 
deviation. The higher isthe Sharpe ratio, the better is the portfolio return relative to risk, or the 
larger is the excess return per unit of risk in a portfolio. All Sharpe ratios are negative, except 
for C23, T17 and T33, while the Sharpe ratio of T17 is higher than all the eight selected 
warrants in China. Nearly all the Sharpe ratios are negative, which implies that, in general, 
investors are losing money in both China and Taiwan warrant markets.  
 
The Sharpe ratio of T17 is higher than all the eight selected warrants in China. In general, the 
Sharpe ratio for warrants for Taiwan is higher than those in China, which indicates that Taiwan 
warrants perform better than their counterparts in China. It can be concluded that, in general, 
the Sharpe ratio for warrants for Taiwan is more appealing, while that from China is too 
negative. This could make investors avoid investing in China warrants which, in turn, could 
lead to the closure of its market. 
 
Similar to the Sharpe ratio, all Jensen indexes are also negative, except for T17 and T33. T33 
has the highest Jensen index among all the warrants. A higher Jensen index suggests a higher 
level of return given the level of risk (systematic or market) on the investment. A low Jensen 
index, such as a negative number, indicates an inferior performance given the level of risk. The 
empirical findings that the values of the Jensen index for most warrants from both China and 
Taiwan are negative imply a poor performance of both warrant markets during the sample 
period. It is interesting that T33 is higher than all eight selected warrants in China. Nevertheless, 
the Jensen index of T1 (the Taiwan warrant with minimum Jensen index) is also larger than its 




In general, the Jensen index for warrants for Taiwan is higher than in China, inferring that 
Taiwan warrants perform better than China warrants. Thus, we can conclude that, in general, 
the Jensen index for warrants for Taiwan is more appealing, while that from China is too 
negative. This could make investors avoid investing in China warrants which, in turn, could 
lead to the closure of the market in China. 
 
The Treynor ratio expresses the relationship of excess fund return, with the beta lying along 
the security market line taking account of the systematic risk or market volatility as its measure 
of risk, instead of the standard deviation, as in the Sharpe ratio. The Treynor index for China 
ranges from -61 to +20, indicating that China warrants are very volatile. The higher volatility 
in the China warrants could make investors avoid investing in China warrants which, in turn, 
makes it more likely that could lead to the closure of the market. 
In summary, , CAPM analysis demonstrates that Taiwan warrants perform better than China 
warrants in terms of the Sharpe ratio and Jensen index. In addition, the China warrant market 
is volatile for investors according to the Treynor ratio. Therefore, China closed its warrant 
market after the end of the share-split reform, which expired completely in 2010. In the future, 
China might rethink reopening its warrant market and learning from mature-covered warrant 
markets, such as Taiwan, as to how tit might be possible to inhibit excess speculation and to 
educate warrant investors. 
4.3  SD analysis 
 
 
Table 3 reports the SD results based on the modified DD statistics. From the SD results, most 
of the China warrants stochastically dominate Taiwan warrants at the second and third orders, 
implying that risk averters prefer investing in China warrants to Taiwan warrants. However, 
there are still some pairs of China and Taiwan warrants that do not dominate each other. For 
example, for the pair of minimum mean return, C14 does not dominate T13 for any order. For 
the comparison among the maximum Jensen ratio, there is no SD between C14 and T33 for 
any order.  
[Table 3 here] 
 
In order to illustrate the SD relationship better, we plot the distributions of the excess returns, 
F and G, for China and Taiwan warrants, and the corresponding DD statistics for the pair of 
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C23 and T33, as shown in Figure 1. From Figure 1, we find that F is below G for some negative 
returns, while G is below F for some positive returns, implying that the excess return in the 
China warrant is preferred in the negative domain, while the excess return in the Taiwan 
warrant is preferred in the positive domain. In addition, it is clear that the first-order DD statistic 
(T1) is negative when the returns are negative, and becomes positive when the returns are 
positive. These results imply that the excess return in the China warrant is preferred in the 
negative return and the excess return in the Taiwan warrant is preferred in the positive return. 
It is also worth noting that both the second- and third-order DD statistics (T2 and T3) are 
negative, with some regions being significant. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
In general, all investors with increasing utility functions prefer the negative excess return in 
China warrants and prefer the positive excess return in Taiwan warrants. For these reasons, 
there is no first-order SD between China and Taiwan warrants, and no arbitrage opportunity 
(see Guo et al. (2017) and the references listed therein for further information) in the markets 
for China and Taiwan warrants.  
 
However, China warrants dominate Taiwan warrants at the second and third orders, implying 
that second- and third-order risk averters prefer to invest in China as compared with Taiwan. 
This implies that the markets for China and Taiwan warrants are not efficient if investors are 
risk averters (see Qiao et al. (2012) , Clark et al. (2016), and the references cited therein, for 
further information).  
 
It can be concluded that China warrants could be underpriced, so that it is more difficult for 
China warrant issuers to make profits. This could be one of the main reasons why the market 
for China warrants closed. Another reason that China presently has no warrant market is that 
the warrants issued by companies are used for compensation in the share reform during 2004 
to 2008, which expired in 1 to 2 years. China closed its warrants market because of the gradual 
expiration of reform-related warrants, excessive speculation, and lack of understanding of the 
warrants market by its participants. 
 




We further examine the market activities between the China and Taiwan warrants. In order to 
do so, we analyse the daily trading volumes of China and Taiwan warrants that were selected 
in Section 3.1. In order to make the comparison practical, we convert both currencies in USD 
and exhibit the daily trading dollar value when the prices are in USD. These results are 
presented in Table 4 for China and Taiwan warrants.  
[Table 4 here] 
 
From Table 4, we find that the average daily trading volume of most China warrants is of order 
105 , while that of most Taiwan warrants are of the order 102. The average daily trading volume 
of individual China warrant is 103 times greater than that of individual Taiwan warrants. Thus, 
it can be concluded that the China warrant market is much more active than its Taiwan 
counterpart. 
In China, there were only 55 warrants traded in the market, but the trading volume was once 
ranked the highest in the world. In Taiwan, the warrant market has experienced rises and falls, 
but there are currently more than 10 thousand warrants issued every year. Although the total 
trading volumes of warrants in China and Taiwan are the highest in the world, China had far 
fewer warrants than did Taiwan. Thus, it is not surprising that the trading volume for “each 
warrant” in China is much greater than in Taiwan. Investors in China prefer warrants to stocks 
because of trading rules and transaction costs, as mentioned in Section 1. Thus, they are keen 
to trade fewer warrants available in the market, and hope to chase for the prices of warrants 
(Xiong and Yu, 2011). In other words, the China warrant market is predominantly speculative, 
which can cause a greater number of trades. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks   
 
Academics, practitioners, and policy makers are interested in examining why the warrant 
market in China closed.  In order to study this phenomenon, Fung et al. (2009) point out the 
issues of over-speculation and lack of recognition of participants. Liao and Chen (2010) 
determine that the expiration of call warrants have a significantly negative price effect during 
the last few days of the sample period. Xiong and Yu (2011) find that the daily trading volume 
of many warrants is more than 3 times of the issuance volume.  
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Chang et al. (2013) discovered that the market price of warrants is far higher than the prices 
from Black-Scholes models using historical volatilities. Liao et al. (2014) find that 121.64 
million shares of warrants were either exercised with an immediate loss, or failed to be 
exercised. Powers and Xiao (2014) show that put warrant market prices averaged 1.2 yuan 
more than model-generated prices (over-priced), while call warrant prices averaged 1.9 yuan 
less (under-priced).  
In this paper, we bridge a gap in the literature by using moment analysis, CAPM statistics, SD 
test, and volume analysis to examine investor preferences towards warrants between China and 
Taiwan, and investigate why the market for warrants in China closed while the market for 
Taiwan warrants is succeeding.  
Using moment analysis, we find that the mean excess returns are, in general, higher for Taiwan 
warrants, while most of the mean excess returns for China warrants are negative. In addition, 
most of the China warrants have more significant and negative skewness, and significant and 
greater kurtosis than Taiwan warrants. This information implies that buying China warrants has 
a much higher chance for sustaining losses than Taiwan warrants. This could make investors 
avoid investing in China warrants which, in turn, could lead to the closure of the market for 
China warrants.                    
Using CAPM analysis, the Sharpe ratio for warrants for Taiwan is higher than for China, and 
the Jensen index for warrants in Taiwan is higher than in China, inferring that Taiwan warrants 
perform better than China warrants. In general, both the Sharpe ratio and Jensen index for 
warrants for Taiwan are more attractive, while those for China are too negative. This could 
make investors avoid investing in China warrants which, in turn, could lead to the closure of 
the market for China warrants. On the other hand, the Treynor index for China warrants shows 
that they are very volatile which, in turn, could also lead to the closure of the market of China 
warrants.   
In summary, CAPM analysis demonstrates that Taiwan warrants perform better than China 
warrants in terms of the Sharpe ratio and Jensen index. In addition, the China warrant market 
is volatile for investors, according to the Treynor ratio. Therefore, China closed its warrant 
market after the end of the share-split reform, whereby the warrants expired completely in 2010. 
In the future, China might think about reopening its warrant market and learning from mature-
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covered warrant markets, such as Taiwan, how to inhibit excess speculation and to educate 
warrant investors. 
Using SD analysis, there are no arbitrage opportunities between the China and Taiwan warrant 
markets, but the warrant markets in China and Taiwan are not efficient because the China 
warrant market dominates Taiwan at the second and third orders, implying that second-order 
and third-order risk averters prefer to invest in China compared with Taiwan. This implies that 
the warrant issuers prefer to issue Taiwan warrants than China warrants, which could be another 
reason why the warrant market in China closed.   
Based on volume analysis, the empirical findings show that the average daily trading volume 
of individual China warrants is 103 times higher than individual Taiwan warrants, so that the 
China warrant market is much more active than its counterpart in Taiwan. This would seem to 
suggest that there are more speculative activities in the China warrant market than the Taiwan 
warrant market which, in turn, could lead to China’s decision to close its warrant market.  
Another reason for China presently having no warrant market is that warrants issued by 
companies are used for compensation in the share reform during the period 2004 to 2008, which 
expired in 1-2 years. China closed the warrant market because of the gradual expiration of 
reform-related warrants, excessive speculation, and lack of understanding of the warrants 
market by its participants. 
The findings in the paper are important for investors for their investment decisions regarding 
Taiwan and China warrants, challenging for academics in modelling Taiwan and China 
warrants, and useful for policy makers for their policy making related to Taiwan warrants and 
China warrants. In the future, China might rethink reopening its warrant market and learning 
from mature-covered warrant markets such as Taiwan how to inhibit excess speculation and to 
educate warrant investors.  
The paper investigated the preferences of risk averters to invest in warrants between China and 
Taiwan. Extensions include using other tools to compare the preferences for risk averters to 
invest in warrants between China and Taiwan, as well as investigate the preferences of other 







Summary statistics and CAPM using daily excess returns for  







skewness kurtosis JB Sharpe beta Treynor Jensen 
C06 -0.0201 0.0781 -3.7196 33.9411 10084.75 -0.2579 0.0150 -1.3384 -0.0186 
C12 -0.0186 0.1440 -13.0898 242.2479 1160912.00 -0.1294 -0.0009 20.5741 -0.0183 
C14 -0.0638 0.2956 -8.3235 80.9023 30407.42 -0.2157 -0.0059 10.8959 -0.0624 
C23 0.0011 0.0555 0.4351 5.1238 52.02 0.0204 0.0175 0.0647 -0.0056 
C44 -0.0057 0.0300 2.7879 24.6026 6885.69 -0.1527 0.0115 -0.4943 -0.0058 
C47 -0.0365 0.3155 -13.5417 197.7772 377048.90 -0.1158 -0.0174 2.0965 -0.0298 
C52 -0.0270 0.2297 -13.2963 195.6075 373322.80 -0.1175 0.0397 -0.6796 -0.0405 
C55 -0.0189 0.1171 -2.2507 29.5247 7117.58 -0.1615 0.0003 -60.9548 -0.0190 
T1 -0.0511 0.2409 -0.4242 12.6574 454.26 -0.2121 0.0814 -0.6280 -0.0565 
T12 -0.0341 0.4486 -0.0494 20.9576 1679.60 -0.0760 0.0289 -1.1812 -0.0307 
T13 -0.0573 0.2730 1.3731 15.5192 800.82 -0.2100 0.0232 -2.4702 -0.0560 
T15 -0.0374 0.1388 -2.2828 22.0487 2925.68 -0.2693 0.0225 -1.6632 -0.0343 
T17 0.0053 0.0588 1.9440 11.7270 475.41 0.0892 0.0056 0.9310 0.0037 
T25 -0.0434 0.1742 0.2863 11.0227 336.94 -0.2491 0.0103 -4.2091 -0.0441 
T26 -0.0032 0.2247 0.9245 5.1186 41.19 -0.0144 0.1324 -0.0245 -0.0109 
T33 0.0128 0.1545 -1.0409 10.6930 320.22 0.0829 0.0523 0.2451 0.0094 
Notes: 
C06 – min Sharpe 
C12 – max Treynor 
C14 – min mean, min Jensen 
C23 – max mean, max Sharpe & max Jensen 
C44 – min s.d. 
C47 – max s.d., min beta 
C52 – max beta 
C55 – min Treynor 
T1 – min Jensen 
T12 - max s.d. 
T13 - min mean 
T15 – min Sharpe 
T17 – min s.d., max Sharpe, min beta, max Treynor 
T25 - min Treynor 
T26 – max beta 






MV Results for selected pairwise comparison 
Pairwise Comparison T test F test MV dominance 
C14-T13 µC < µT 
-0.1474 




C23-T33 µC < µT 
-1.041 
σC < σT 
7.7611*** 
C23 ≻C6  T33 
C44-T17 µC < µT 
-2.6106*** 
σC < σT 
3.8564*** 
No 
C47-T12 µC < µT 
-0.0597 
σC < σT 
2.0222*** 
C47 ≻C6T12 
C06-T15 µC > µT 
1.6191 
σC < σT 
3.1598*** 
C06 ≻C6T15 
C23-T17 µC < µT 
-0.6578 
σC < σT 
1.1249 
No 
C47-T17 µC < µT 
-1.4663 
σC > σT 
28.7523*** 
C47 ≻C6T17 
C52-T26 µC < µT 
-0.9425 
σC > σT 
1.0449 
No 
C55-T25 µC < µT 
1.5869 
σC < σT 
2.2131*** 
C55 ≻C6  T25 
C12-T17 µC < µT 
-1.8125* 
σC > σT 
5.9872*** 
T17 ≻C6C12 
C23-T01 µC > µT 
3.1743*** 
σC < σT 
18.8615*** 
C23 ≻C6  T01 
C14-T33 µC < µT 
-2.4578** 




C14-T13 is the pair of mean min, C23-T33 is the pair of mean max.  
C44-T17 is the pair of s.d min, C47-T12 is the pair of s.d max. 
C06-T15 is the pair of Sharpe ratio min, C23-T17 is the pair of Sharpe ratio max. 
C47-T17 is the pair of beta min, C52-T26 is the pair of beta max. 
C55-T25 is the pair of Treynor ratio min, C12-T17 is the pair of Treynor ratio max. 





Table 3  
 
SD Results for selected pairwise comparison 
 
Pairwise Comparison Ascending SD 
C14-T13 No SD 
C23-T33 C ≻2,3 T  
C44-T17 C ≻2,3 T  
C47-T12 C ≻2,3 T   
C06-T15 C ≻2,3 T   
C23-T17 C ≻2,3 T   
C47-T17 No SD 
C52-T26 C ≻2,3 T  
C55-T25 C ≻2,3 T   
C12-T17 C ≻2,3 T   
C23-T01 C ≻2,3 T   
C14-T33 No SD 
Notes:  
C14-T13 is the pair of mean min, C23-T33 is the pair of mean max.  
C44-T17 is the pair of s.d min, C47-T12 is the pair of s.d max. 
C06-T15 is the pair of Sharpe ratio min, C23-T17 is the pair of Sharpe ratio max. 
C47-T17 is the pair of beta min, C52-T26 is the pair of beta max. 
C55-T25 is the pair of Treynor ratio min, C12-T17 is the pair of Treynor ratio max. 








Summary statistics of trading volume (in USD) for  
selected China and Taiwan warrants 
 
Warrant code Mean std. dev. skewness kurtosis JB 
C06 96150.9500 73283.1200 2.1843 10.0706 690.7704 
C12 173603.0000 324388.6000 3.4949 17.0166 4926.9010 
C14 46306.6400 44987.5000 1.8837 7.1179 150.5576 
C23 55458.4900 46573.7300 1.9508 8.4068 440.8489 
C44 214101.4000 178940.0000 1.9563 7.5217 718.0678 
C47 40012.9900 40078.6000 2.3406 10.4683 760.7066 
C52 59475.6700 51874.5500 2.4878 10.7968 848.3305 
C55 48996.5800 60061.5300 3.2302 16.5166 2216.2940 
T1 15.3537 103.6143 10.5616 113.3553 61544.3700 
T12 18.4588 72.0669 9.8558 105.4079 57098.5700 
T13 25.7770 127.7570 10.4158 111.5797 60098.8800 
T15 11.4235 75.4091 13.2409 178.1744 240636.5000 
T17 0.1405 0.4666 4.8718 29.5315 4194.0060 
T25 37.7894 74.4648 2.3908 8.2631 265.4654 
T26 79.8744 149.2158 7.2949 69.3507 24230.2100 









Figure 1  
Ascending DD Statistics Distribution for C23-T33 
 
 
Note: 0 	is the test statistic defined in (3) for  j = 1, 2, and 3. F and G are the CDFs of the excess warrant returns 
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